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ABSTRACT
The mere mention of the name "Vietnam" conjures up a multitude of conflicting images
and emotions in the hearts and minds of individual Americans. The current move toward a
normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (SRV) demands a new perspective be taken on this traditional ambivalence. By
exploring the geographical, cultural, and historical development of political and military
organizations in Vietnam, this thesis goes beyond the focus of most sociological models that
begin their examination of civil-military relations in Vietnam with the Communist lead revolution
of 1945. One such model, that of the Revolutionary Professional Soldier, is used by this author
to examine the evolutionary nature of civil-military relations in Vietnam, from their earliest
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis is a study of a civil-military relationship vastly different from that
of the one found in the United States (US). Specifically, the evolution of civil-
military relations in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. One might ask why it is
important to have an understanding of the specific type of civil-military
relationship manifest in any given state? In the US, one may carry this line of
thinking even further and ask why study Vietnam? After all, of all the wars and
armed conflicts that the United States has been involved in throughout its history,
only the Civil War may have tested the very soul of the nation more than the
Vietnam War. Issues of US National Security provide a few of the motivating
influences behind this thesis.
As reasonable as this proposition may sound, the body of literature available
to conduct research on the nature of civil-military relations in Vietnam is
remarkably austere. Why is this so? There is no lack of concern by the military
and academic analysts. A vast body of data exists on Vietnam, but it is mainly
oriented toward acquiring intelligence on the capabilities of specific weapons
systems and command and control structures.
As a Civil Affairs specialist, I am required to be an expert on a specific state
within its unique historical, cultural, and civil-military context. My duties require
that I assess the impact of all US stated policies (overt and covert) on the state
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under investigation, here it is Vietnam. Although this thesis is being researched in
an academic environment, the basic intent of this project is to prepare me for my
first real life encounter with my People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) counterpart in
the near future.
I firmly believe that ignorance breeds misunderstandings which result in
needless conflict. It is my contention that the national interests of the US and the
SRV will be best served if each state works together in a cooperative and mutually
beneficial manner. For this to happen, it is imperative that each side have a
fundamental understanding of both the structure and nature of the civil-military
relationships that shape the others' version of reality. This thesis is my
contribution to the US half of the equation.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the evolutionary nature of civil-
military relations in Vietnam. My research proceeds from three basic questions:
1) Does the theory of civil-military relations in communist political systems, as
described by Perlmutter and LeoGrande maintains its validity when applied to
Vietnam? 2) What does the comparison of the theory to the situation in Vietnam
tell us about the nature of the current civil-military relationship in Vietnam? And
Finally, 3) What predictions can be made about the continued evolution of civil-
military relations in Vietnam?
By addressing these questions, this thesis will remain faithful to its intent and
verify a string of hypotheses related to civil-military relations in the SRV. It is my
hope that this research will be of value to decision makers and policy analysts
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within the Departments of Defense and State, and to those employing US Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) assets in Southeast Asia.
The research design for this thesis began with a canvassing of alternate
disciplines such as - anthropology, psychology, and "Hanoiology" - to gain a
theoretical insight into the historic and cultural forces that shape the development
of human interaction. Too often, however, I found that these disciplines failed to
consider the positive and negative functions of the military in the development
process. To overcome this shortcoming, I turned to sociology because of its link
to the study of civil-military relations.
Within the field of sociology, I searched for a coherent framework from
which to begin my work. There is a vast body of literature that attempts to
explain how the party and the army function in communist countries such as
Vietnam. The model I chose is one based on the work done by Amos Perlmutter
and William M. LeoGrande of American University. It is my belief that they have
outlined a theory of civil-military relations in communist countries, The Party in
Uniform: The Professional Revolutionary Soldier, that when applied will best
explain the situation in Vietnam.
In the most basic of terms, the Professional Revolutionary Soldier is foremost
the creation of an armed revolution to change both the political and social
structure of a state. His must be subordinate to a hegemonic Marxist-Leninist
Party, see himself as a servant of the peasant class, and view military involvement
in the political and economic process of the state as legitimate acts.
I have organized this thesis into seven chapters. Together, these chapters
trace the evolution of civil-military relations in Vietnam from their earliest
manifestations to the present day. In total, the chapters look at the notion of
struggle and revolution. In this light, one may then ask the question: Are civil-
military relations in Vietnam based on a revolutionary ethos? Of course they are.
Vietnam has been in a state of revolution for over one hundred years. However,
little attention is paid to this rich tradition of political and military struggle. Most
of the research on communist civil-military relations, credits the Ho Chi Minh's
Communist lead revolution of 1945 with creating the "revolutionary state mind
set" present in modern Vietnam. To the extent that geographical, cultural, and
historical factors influenced the development of the Revolutionary Professional




This thesis is a study of a civil-military relationship vastly different from that
of the one found in the United States (US). Specifically, the evolution of civil-
military relations in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). One might ask why
it is important to have an understanding of the specific type of civil-military
relationship manifest in any given state? In the US, one may carry this line of
thinking even further and ask why study Vietnam? After all, of all the wars and
armed conflicts that the US has been involved in throughout its history, only the
Civil War may have tested the very soul of the nation more than the Vietnam
War. Issues of US national security provide a few of the motivating influences
behind this thesis.
As reasonable as this proposition may sound, the body of literature available
to conduct research on the nature of civil-military relations in Vietnam is
remarkably austere. Why is this so? There is no lack of concern by the military
and academic analysts. A vast body of data exists on Vietnam, but it is mainly
oriented toward acquiring intelligence on the capabilities of specific weapons
systems and command and control structures.
As a Civil Affairs specialist, I am required to be an expert on a specific state
within its unique historical, cultural, and civil-military context. My duties require
that I assess the impact of all US stated policies (overt and covert) on the state
under investigation, here it is Vietnam. Although this thesis is being researched in
an academic environment, the basic intent of this project is to prepare me for my
first real life encounter with my People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) counterpart in
the near future.
I firmly believe that ignorance breeds misunderstandings which result in
needless conflict. It is my contention that the national interests of the US and the
SRV will be best served if each state works together in a cooperative and mutually
beneficial manner. For this to happen, it is imperative that each side have a
fundamental understanding of both the structure and nature of the civil-military
relationships that shape the others' vision of reality. This thesis is my contribution
to the US half of the equation.
A. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this study is to investigate the evolutionary nature of civil-
military relations in Vietnam. 1 My research proceeds from three basic questions:
1) Does the theory of civil-military relations in communist political systems, as
described by Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande maintain its validity when
applied to Vietnam? 2) What does the comparison of the theory to the situation in
Vietnam tell us about the nature of current civil-military relations? And Finally, 3)
Mn order not to confuse the reader, throughout this thesis I use a single term to
identify the geographic region of Southeast Asia that has at varies times been known as:
Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, French IndoChina, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Republic of Vietnam, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The term I have chosen is
simply "Vietnam".
What predictions can be made about the continued evolution of civil-military
relations in Vietnam?
By addressing these questions, this thesis will remain faithful to its intent and
verify a string of hypotheses related to civil-military relations in the SRV. It is my
hope that this research will be of value to decision makers and policy analysts
within the Departments of Defense and State, and to those employing US Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) assets in Southeast Asia.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The research design for this thesis began with a canvassing of alternate
disciplines such as - anthropology, psychology, and "Hanoiology" - to gain a
theoretical insight into the historic and cultural forces that shape the development
of human interaction. Too often, however, I found that these disciplines failed to
consider the positive and negative functions of the military in the development
process. To overcome this shortcoming, I then turned to sociology because of its
link to the study of civil-military relations.
Within the field of sociology, I searched for a coherent framework from
which to begin my work. There is a vast body of literature that attempts to
explain how the party and the army function in communist countries such as
Vietnam. The model I chose is one based on the work done by Amos Perlmutter
and William M. LeoGrande of American University. It is my belief that they have
outlined a theory of civil-military relations in communist countries, The Party in
Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political
Systems, 2 that when applied will best explain the situation in Vietnam.
In the most basic of terms, the Revolutionary Professional Soldier is foremost
the creation of an armed revolution whose goal is to change both the political and
social structure of a state. His must be subordinate to a hegemonic Marxist-
Leninist Party, see himself as a servant of the peasant class, and view military
involvement in the political and economic process of governing the state as a
legitimate act.
C. ORGANIZATION
I have organized this thesis into seven chapters. Together these chapters
trace the evolution of civil-military relations in Vietnam. Chapter II serves as the
theoretical benchmark on which all proceeding chapters are built. It details the
environmental, structural, and specific type of relationships that make up the
model. In Chapter III, the specific geographical, historical, and cultural factors
unique to Vietnam are discussed as they relate to the development of the
Revolutionary Professional Soldier ethos in Vietnam. Chapter IV builds on the
issues presented in chapter III by discussing the impact of early political and
military forces on the Vietnamese case. Chapter IV concerns itself with the Period
of Civil-Military Evolution. In it I look at formal and informal aspects of the Party-
2Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a
Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems", American Political
Science Review, 76:4, 1982, p. 778-789.
State and Party-Military interaction as they relate to the model. These
relationships fall into three basic types - fused, symbiotic, and coalitional.
Chapter VI serves as an overview of the nature of current civil-military conflicts in
Vietnam. Finally, Chapter VII is a summary and concluding statement on the
results of my research in to the three questions at the heart of this thesis.
D. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS ENCOUNTERED
The nature of the issue being studied, the contexts within which one must
conduct research, and the questionable nature of available data are the primary
factors that make scientific analyses of Vietnamese civil-military relations difficult,
although possible. The closed, paranoid, and fearful nature of the Vietnamese
government add to the difficulties of gathering primary source material. There is
little official public documentation available and uncensored newspaper sources
are nonexistent. These facts are compounded by a lack of qualified Vietnamese
linguists in both the academic and military community. Finally, all of the factors
listed above have been compounded by the constant state of war present in the
region.
My research has therefore been limited to sources such as SRV Government
documents available through Dr. Douglas Pike's IndoChina Archives, official radio
broadcasts and newspapers stories translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), declassified US intelligence files, academic books and monographs,
and personal interviews with individuals that are operating in the region either on
commercial, humanitarian, or official government business.
II. THE REVOLUTIONARY PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER DEFINED
This chapter forms the basic framework for the analysis of civil-military
relations, as seen in the case of Vietnam that follows. It is in the application of
the theoretical model described by Perlmutter and LeoGrande, paraphrased
below, that this author will attempt to answer the three research question posed
in Chapter I. Specifically: 1) Does the theory of civil-military relations in
communist political systems, as described by Perlmutter and LeoGrande maintains
its validity when applied to Vietnam? 2) What does the comparison of the theory
to the situation in Vietnam tell us about the nature of the current civil-military
relationship in Vietnam? And Finally, 3) What predictions can be made about the
continued evolution of civil-military relations in Vietnam?
The underlining philosophy of the Revolutionary Professional Soldier is that
of struggle. Unlike his western counterparts, the Revolutionary Professional
Soldier must - 1) be born of a social as well as political struggle and 2) have the
revolution remain a constant source of both legitimacy and motivation thorough
out his existence. The orientation of the Revolutionary Professional Soldier is to
maintain the revolution and to protect the independence of the revolutionary
state. The archetypical political revolution of the post World War II time frame
has to date been one conducted by socialist political parties. These revolutions
are either against an imperial power or a traditional host regime. In either case,
the revolution has as its primary objectives the destruction of the old political
institutions, social structures, and value orientations. Once these influences are
eliminated, they are replaced with a new socialist structure.
In order to accumulate the required amount of political power needed by
the socialist's to conduct a successful revolution, they must create their own
military force. One closely tied to and highly controlled by a dominant Marxist-
Leninist party. This melding of interests is accomplished by a vanguard party that
supervises, coordinates, and directs the functions of both the military and the
state.
It is with in this environment that the Revolutionary Professional Soldier can
be found. His function is to participate in the daily administration of all
economic, political, and social aspects of the state, while simultaneously serving
as the protector of the state, the party, and the revolutionary ideology that is the
basis of the ongoing revolution.
Revolutionary Professional Soldiers are purposefully politicized by the party
they serve. This fact allows them to act as a powerful ally in relation to issues
concerning either potential or actual conflict within the institutions of state. Thus,
participation of the military in the political process is tolerated more in
revolutionary societies than in states with stable well established political orders.
8
The diffuseness of the boundaries between the civil and the military institutions is
acknowledged by both soldiers and politicians as being legitimate. 3
The relationship of the party to the military is influenced by the hegemonic
status of the dominant socialist party. Additionally, the absence of constitutional
means to transfer power within the state and the existence of paramilitary
organizations both in and around the regular military forces combine to make the
Revolutionary Professional Soldier subordinate to a movement, party, or regime
that is certainly more resilient than his own institution. His roles within the
government are numerous. They include: guardian of communist party
legitimacy and ideological heritage, preserving the status quo, maintaining the
balance of power within the revolutionary government, enforcer of political and
constitutional mandates, quasi-revolutionary agent of the party in bordering states,
and defender of the homeland.
In the revolutionary state it is only the Revolutionary Professional Soldier
that is able to achieve both professional proficiency and pride, as well as a high
social status. In, short, Revolutionary Professional Soldiers see themselves as
members of the masses, which helps to explain why they do not exercise
governmental power themselves. Over time, the relationship between the
3 Despite the influence gained by their positions in the governing structure,
Revolutionary Professional Soldiers never use the threat of a coup d'etat as a bargaining
tool. His ability to cope with the revolutionary environment and his influential role in
the realm of foreign and defense policy are partial explanations of his failure to
intervene. See Perlmutter and LeoGrande, pp. 786-788.
Revolutionary Professional Soldier and the hegemonic Marxist-Leninist party can
evolve. The evolution, if it takes place, involves three separate types of civil-
military relationships - fused, symbiotic, and coalitional. Each is characterized by
the following definitions.
A fused relationship is one noted for a lack of either a truly hegemonic
Marxist-Leninist party. It is one where the military and political functions struggle
are accomplished by a single entity. Additionally, the initial entity that assumes
power after the revolution is incapable of fulfilling the duties of both administrator
and defender of the state. Castro's 26th of July Movement revolution in Cuba is
cited as an ideal example of this type of relationship. 4
A symbiotic relationship is one of living together, a partnership involving
one another, and is associated with the survival of each institutional structure. It
is a system of high dependance more than of mutual benefits. Symbiotic
relationships are characterized by low levels of difference between military and
non-military elites. This allows for extensive circulation of middle and lower level
administrators in both institutions, due to the relative obscurity of institutional
boundaries. This same level of integration is difficult to sustain after the
revolution ends and priority of the government shifts from survival to domestic
reform. Due to an emerging division of labor between the military and civilian




increase. The Chinese revolution under Mao Zadong is cited as an ideal case
study of this type of relationship. 5
A coalitional relationship is one based on a desire to secure mutual benefit
for each of the institutions of state involved. In order for the benefits to be
attained and the social status of the institutions to be maintained, the state must
be facing a combination of internal and external adversaries. Despite the specific
nature of the threats faced by the state, institutional autonomy is the greatest
concern of each group. This is possible because of a high degree of military
technological complexity requiring specialized knowledge not available to civilian
elites. This high degree of autonomy concerning defense related matters, creates
a high degree of autonomy within the military. The Russian revolution of the
Bolsheviks in 1917 which lead to the creation of the Soviet Union is cited as an






III. HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ON REVOLUTIONARY MODEL
Contrary to what most Americans may believe, 2 July 1976 7 is not the first
time that Vietnam had been an independent sovereign state. It had in fact existed
as a separate and independent empire for nearly a thousand years prior its
conquest by France in 1885.
In this chapter, I explore the geographical, cultural, and colonial influences
that are an important part of the Vietnamese historical landscape. It provides the
uninitiated with a basic understanding of the forces at work in Vietnam during its
pre-revolutionary period. After all, it is within this geographical and historical
framework that the Communist Revolution of 1945 began.
The following pages provide an example of how the Vietnamese throughout
their long history of revolution have used small unit operations, nationalism as a
uniting ideology, cooperation between the social classes, and the notion of mass
struggle to defeat all would be conquerors. The final revolution, in 1976, must
therefore be considered in terms of the geographical, historical, and political
7The is much discussion as to the exact time that "Vietnam" became a separate
identity. Dates such as 939 AD and 21 July 1954 are some commonly mentioned in
studies of Vietnam. I subscribe to the notion of the first unified "Vietnam" under
Emperor Gia Long in 1802 since it is the first to unify all three of the ancient kingdoms
that make up modern Vietnam and the first to use the name Viet-Nam to describe itself.
See Chester A. Bain, Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict , (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1967), pp. 80-81.
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factors which shaped the mind set of the individuals who came to embody the
Revolutionary Professional Soldier ethos.
A. GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS
Starting at China's southern border and extending all the way to the tip of
the Indochinese Peninsula, the territory of present-day Vietnam 8
,
occupies the
eastern boundary of Southeast Asia, in a shape reminiscent of a lazy "S". It is
bordered to the north by the Guangxi and Yunnan provinces of China; to the east
and south by the South China Sea, and to the west by Cambodia and Laos.
Vietnam is approximately the size of the state of Florida with an estimated
population of 70 million. 9 Stretching nearly 1,650 kilometers long, the country
undulates to widths ranging between 50 and 500 km's and covers a total land
area of 331,688 square kilometers. 10
Comprehending the geographic configuration of the land is extremely
significant if one is to understanding the movement of people and armies in
ancient, as well as modern times. Vietnam's topography is dominated by two
fertile alluvial river deltas - the Red River in the north and the Mekong in the
south. Both of these areas have traditionally been known for their intensive
8
Refer to Map 1
.
9
1 993 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Census estimate based on an annual increase of
960,000.
10Department of the Army, Vietnam: A Country Study . Area Studies Handbook, DA
PAM 550-32, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 84.
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agriculture and have historically produced the bulk of the rice required to support
the needs of the population. 11 A narrow strip of smaller costal plains connects
these two larger and more productive plains.
For most of their history, the core-Vietnamese 12 people lived primarily in the
Red River Delta region. Over the course of history, the Vietnamese gradually
expanded southward into the Mekong Delta region. Its conquest was completed
by the middle of the 18th century thus creating the modern borders of Vietnam.
The primarily reason for this strict southward movement was the existence of the
Annamite Cordillera. This mountain range runs in a generally north-south
direction along the modern Vietnamese borders with Laos and Cambodia. At
certain points along the chain, mountain peaks attain elevations of over 10,000
feet. This natural obstacle has historically limited the east-west movement of
settlers, refugees, and armies alike between Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to only
a few difficult mountain passes. This geographic isolation helped create a sense
of "Viet" nationalism. These natural boundaries allowed the Vietnamese to ward
off invasion from all but the strongest of enemies, such as the colonial powers and
its northern neighbor, China.
"The Red River Delta, unlike its southern counterpart the Mekong, however, has
long since reached its optimum agricultural expansion. See Ibid, p. 155.
12
l refer to those tribes that make up the ethnic group associated with Vietnam's Red
River Delta. Other ethnic groups were living in this area, but are considered of a
different ethnic line. See Department of the Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of
Vietnam . Ethnographic Study Series, DA PAM 550-105, (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1966) for more details.
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Trading space for time has traditionally been a viable tactic in the
Vietnamese political and military arsenal of weapons. The mountainous and rural
areas of the country have long proven themselves to be viable safe areas.
Occupation forces have traditionally focused their efforts on controlling the urban
centers while leaving the densely forested and impenetrable swamps to a host of
rebel groups, mountain tribes, and bandits alike.
The natural environment also serves as a weapon against would be invaders.
The monsoon rains flood turn small streams into rivers and rivers into raging
torrents. The wide expanses of mangrove swaps also limited movement in the
deltas and along the coastline. The effects of overpowering heat and humidity
have proven deadly to unacclimated foreign troops, especially when combined
with the ravages of malaria and jungle rot.
B. THE CHINESE INFLUENCE
Throughout history the Vietnamese have often disagreed about what the true
essence of their nation is, however, all seem to agree that their nation is not
under any circumstances to be considered a dependency of China. Yet, none can
dispute China's influential role in every period of Vietnamese history. China
overshadows Vietnam geographically, demographically, linguistically, culturally,
and politically. Other states have influenced Vietnam's development for brief
periods of time - the French, Dutch, Japanese, and United States, but all have left
15
beaten and demoralized. China alone is and always has been maintained a
constant presence.
The millennium of direct Chinese rule (1 1 1 BC-975 AD) saw a flood of
Chinese refugees entering the Red River Delta region. These were not peasant
farmers fleeing oppressive landlords, however, but rather well-accomplished
scholars, government officials, and wealthy merchants who had fallen out of favor
with the Chinese government under Wang Mang (AD 9-23). 13
During the settlement process, the Chinese established themselves as agents
of modernization and introduced their literary classics, Confucian ethics, Chinese
ideographs, the art of printing, the minting of coins, silkworms, and porcelain
manufacturing to the people of the region. The Mahayana form of Buddhism was
also introduced to Vietnam by Chinese scholars and preachers beginning in the
fifth century AD. It competed very successfully with the local Vietnamese forms
of religion.
Despite these influences, it is difficult to measure the depth of assimilation
of Chinese culture by the Vietnamese. During this period many Vietnamese
adopted outward signs of assimilation, dress, hair style, and religion being a few
examples but also adapted Chinese ways to meet their own needs. 14 The impact
of the Chinese Mandarin system, however, did have a visible and lasting impact
13Nguyen Kac Vien, Traditional Vietnam: Some Historical Stages. (Hanoi: Hanoi




on Vietnam. Its Confucian values, helped the Vietnamese elite further erect a
wall of authority that tended to buttress their dominate social and economic
position vis-a-vis the peasantry. This aspect of Chinese culture would play a
significant role in the scope of future revolutions.
These same factors also bred an air of condescension toward people of other
walks of life and a tendency to look to the past for precedents to solve current
problems. It was also a way of thinking that considered non-Confucian outsiders
as barbarians. Vietnamese relations with the western powers during the colonial
period must be seen against this backdrop of a constrictive Chinese legacy. It was
into this environment that the first colonial powers entered Vietnam.
C. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
For the first two centuries of their presence in Asia, the French were far
more successful in their religious activities than in establishing trade or the
acquisition of new colonial territories. 15 Despite a long history of involvement in
Vietnam, it was not until the mid-1 800's that the French were able to make major
15The French were not the first Europeans to reach Vietnam. It was the Portuguese
who first found the route around the Cape of Good Hope and sailed to the coast of
Vietnam in the middle of the sixteenth century. As the Portuguese fortunes declined,
their monopoly of the eastern trade was broken. By the middle of the seventeenth
century both the Dutch and English had established trading posts in Hanoi. See Joseph
Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), pp.
55-66.
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territorial gains. 16 These gains came partly as a pretense to protect French
nationals (chiefly missionaries), but primarily as a function of continued European
expansionism. The initial religious success of the French, however, was short
lived as Catholic values and ideas began to be viewed as a direct threat to their
power by the ruling Vietnamese kings. 17 Such an attitude was enhanced by
continued missionary involvement in court politics. During this sixty year period,
hostility toward Catholics and foreign influences in general continued to increase.
After several missteps, the French set up a permanent "establishment" in
Vietnam following the military expedition of 1860. French military forces then
used this area as a base from which to launch a series of conquests: 1862: half
of Cochinchina; 1863: most of Cambodia; 1867: the rest of Cochinchina; 1883:
Annam; 1885: Tonkin; 1893: Laos; and in 1907: the Siamese Provinces of
Cambodia. This series of military conquests finally gave the French what they had
so long desired, control of a resource rich and militarily strategic outpost at the
crossroads of Asian civilization, but more importantly at the crossroads of the very
lucrative Asian spice trade. 18
16The French East India Company was established in 1664. This was followed in
1669 by the establishment of a French trading office in Vietnam at Pho Hien. See Ibid,
p. 59.
^Particularly Emperor Minh Mang (1820-1841) and his successors Thieu Tri (1841-
1847) and Tu Due (1847-1883). See Ibid, 74.
18Francis J. Corley, "Viet-Nam Since Geneva." Thought . Volume XXXIII, Number 131
(Winter 1958-59), pp. 516-517.
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The French, like the Chinese before them, tried to impose their own set of
religious, cultural, economic, and administrative standards on the Vietnamese.
The tenant farmer based agricultural system was replaced with one based on
plantations. No longer were traditional crops grown to support local needs, but
rather new crops were cultivated to support the needs of the international export
market. 19 The French groomed an elite class of second and third tier
administrators to operate in the areas beyond direct French control, in much the
same way the Chinese had tried to run Vietnam. The results were also similar.
This approach breed a sense of dissatisfaction within the elite and non-elite
groups as neither group viewed itself as benefiting from the new social and
economic arrangement. These changes only served to reinforce their sense that
the French were just another oppressive invader. The combination of a lack of
emphasis placed on the traditional Confucian classic's20 and the disruption of the
traditional power structures within the village system sowed seeds of discontent
that would come to bloom under communist nurturing in the near future.
Prior to the beginning of World War II, the French administrative mandate
over IndoChina consisted of six political units 21 . Vietnamese national sentiment,
19Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in
Vietnam. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 171-172.
20The last national traditional Confucian Civil Service Examination was held in 1919.
See Vietnam: A Country Study , p. 103.
21The colony of Cochinchina in the south of Vietnam, four protectorates, the
Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, the Annamite Empire, and Tonkin, and finally the
territory of Kwangchowan at the northwestern end of the Luichow Peninsula in south
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which had never fully accepted Chinese domination a millennium earlier, was no
more willing to accept a European overlord in modern times. The result was a
series of local rebellions against the colonial mandate.
D. SUMMARY
Two essential elements contributed to the molding of the early Vietnamese
social organization, the struggle against nature and the struggle against would be
conquerors. The rugged physical geography of the region has made subsistence
agriculture a way of life. The Vietnamese peasant was required to scratch out a
living between monsoon rains and drought. All the while, subject to an unending
series of conquests from both regional and European powers.
China always has and always will have a great deal of influence over
Vietnam. They were the ones to introduce Confucian ethics and increase the
development of an elite class. The traditional fear of invasion found in the
Vietnamese originated with its early interaction with the Chinese. Although
conquered militarily, the Vietnamese never allowed themselves to be totally
oppressed by the dominant Chinese. It was during the years of direct Chinese
rule that the Vietnamese developed the strategy of "adapt and wait until the time
is right, then rise up and revolt".
The French colonial experience saw the total exploitation of both the people
and resources of Vietnam. Once again Vietnam had been invaded by a "lesser
China. See Corley, p. 517.
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race" and forced to adapt to a set of foreign values. During this period, traditional
Vietnamese forms of government, religion, agriculture, and social structure were
all disrupted. Again the Vietnamese people adapted to their surroundings and
waited for the right time to revolt against this newest of would be conqueror's.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The impacts of the geographic, environmental, and historical factors
discussed had a definitive impact on the development of a Vietnamese mind set
that was conducive to the introduction of the Revolutionary Professional Soldier
concept. The Vietnamese traditions of mass struggle, a deep sense of "Viet"
nationalism, distrust of everything foreign, and historical sense of impending
invasion combined with their willingness to sacrifice for the greater good of the
nation, laid the groundwork for the integration of political and military systems
long before the Communist lead Revolution of August 1945.
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IV. ORGANIC REVOLUTIONARY INFLUENCES
Given the geographical and historical influences noted in the previous
chapter, it is now appropriate to discuss the modern influences that impacted the
birth of the modern state of Vietnam. Prior to beginning this analysis, however,
one aspect of the definition provided in Chapter II remains constant throughout
the period covered by this analysis and therefore is examined in closer detail. In
this way the analysis that follows can concentrate its efforts on areas of difference
and not on areas of commonality. The aspect of the definition that has remained
constant deals with the issue of political dominance.
Since its inception, the party has been the dominant institution, both in
relation to its civilian counterpart the state bureaucracy and the military. Douglas
Pike describes the relationship this way:
Within the People's Army of Vietnam is, as there has been, the party.
Known by various names over the years, the Vietnamese Communist Party
inside PAVN is the steel rod in a ferro-concrete building, the ever-present
goading conscience, an eternal looming specter. 22
Included in this aspect of an all powerful and dominant political party is the
notion of legitimate military involvement in the political realm. Throughout the
initial periods of civil-military development in Vietnam, military involvement in
politics and vice versa was not only accepted, but was in fact encouraged and in
22 Douglas Pike, PAVN: The People's Army of Vietnam, (New York: Presido Press,
1986), p. 145.
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some instances required. 23 Key leadership positions in both institutions have also
traditionally been held by the same small group of individuals. Each one of these
aspects is more fully defined in the pages that follow.
A. HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE REVOLUTION
The fundamental factor influencing the lives of the Vietnamese is now and
always has been struggle. Struggle against the forces of nature, Chinese
hegemony, corrupt local officials and ruthless warlords, and European colonial
powers. All the while, Vietnam was struggling to either attain or maintain its
independence. This was true for Vietnam all the way from its earliest existence
up to its conquest by France. Despite the "enlightened" administration of
Vietnam by the French, described in the previous section, the life of the common
peasant had not improved significantly during the course of the past few hundred
of years.
24 The common peasant still subsisted on a meager ration of rice and
nuoc mam (fish paste) in a shelter constructed using scraps of wood and bamboo
or clods of dirt. He had a life expectancy of not more than thirty years during
which he was prey to every variety of tropical disease, from malaria to the plague.
In addition to disease, he had two other enemies, his landlord and the local
government, both were all powerful and ever present. To the landlord he owed
23Ho Chi Minh, On Revolution: Selected Writings. 1920-66 . Edited by Bernard B.
Fall, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 139-140.
24James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in
Southeast Asia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 10.
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an ever increasing share of his already meager crop as payment for rent. To his
"government" he owed a never ending series of taxes for which he got almost
nothing in return, and if caught in a recruiting sweep, a tour of duty in the
imperial army. 25 Somehow, this age old misery combined with an undying sense
of nationalistic spirit to plant the seed from which the Revolutionary Professional
Soldier was to grow.
The years leading up to World War I saw new political and ideological
movements beginning to take shape inside Vietnam. These movements, as history
has shown, were based on the idea of Vietnamese nationalism but one that was
being influenced by external ideologies as well. As World War I began, the
Vietnamese people soon learned the costs associated with being a colony were
not just domestic in nature. An additional duty they faced was to go off and help
fight the masters wars. Thousands of Vietnamese nationals were shipped to
Europe to serve in the Allied lines during World War I, but not allowed to serve
as regular combat units. Instead they were assigned tasks such as digging
trenches, loading ammunition, and other manual labor duties. 26
While serving in Europe many of the Vietnamese were for the first time
exposed to cultures other than their own. These individuals found the concepts of
25
Ibid, pp. 44-52 and 104-105.
26An exact number is not available. Estimates are that approximately 100,000 men
were sent to France. 50,000 were served as laborers and another 50,000 as combat
support personnel. See Vietnam: A Country Study , p. 37.
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western democracy and socialist ideology new and extremely applicable to their
own desires for self-rule. Upon returning to Vietnam they began to ask why the
France of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity", for whom they had fought and died,
did not apply these same lofty ideals to their colonial subjects. 27 Ho Chi Minh
(aka: Nguyen Ai Quoc, Nguyen Sinh Cung, Nguyen Tat Thanh, and Ly Thuy) was
one such individual. 28
B. EARLY POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
During the early 1900's, numerous revolts took place in Vietnam. All
tended to be small in scale, unorganized, and lacking broad national support.
Because of their unorganized nature, these uprisings were suppressed easily by
the French military and police forces of the local area. Despite the unsuccessful
nature of these early revolts, they were a harbinger of more serious tests of French
administrative resolve to come. A few individuals were watching and learning
from the mistakes of these early would be revolutionaries.
One such individual was Phan Boi Chau. He is cited by Vietnamese
historians as having made immeasurable contributions to the attainment of
Vietnamese independence and helping Ho Chi Minh develop his revolutionary
27Ho, pp. 5-8.
28D.R. SarDesai, Vietnam: The Struggle for National Identity , (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1992), p. 49.
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strategy. 29 He was the first to develop a broad based organization to promote
Vietnamese independence, the Vietnam Public Offering Society (VPOS). He was
also the first national political figure to advocate the use of violent means to force
a French withdrawal from Vietnam. 30 He carefully noted the successes and
failures of other Asian revolutionaries. 31 Although his were not totally "new"
ideas, they had not yet been applied to the Vietnamese situation. Despite, his
unique perspective, Chau failed to bring about his objective of Vietnamese
independence. His major failure was in not involving the Vietnamese peasant
class, who at the time were the most disgruntled and made up approximately
80% of the total population. Rather, he focused his efforts on enlisting the
support of the scholar gentry class, believing the peasants would automatically
rise up on their own following the lead of the upper classes. 32
29As a child young Nguyen Ai Quoc would spend hours sitting at Chou's feet
listening to him read Vietnamese poetry. See David G. Marr, Vietnamese
Anticolonialism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 255.
30A scholar from Nghe An Province, trained in Confucian tradition by his father and
local teachers. Took his regional examination with highest honors. Founded both the
Vietnam Public Offering Society, 1907 and the Vietnam Restoration Society, 1912. See
William J. Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941 . (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1976), pp. 32-33 and 49-50 and 69-70.
31Chau had become encouraged by the early successes of Sun Yat-Sen in China
during this same time period. He is the first of many Vietnamese revolutionaries to look
to China as a model. This same tactic would be followed by his former student Ho Chi




Chou's was not the only political organization to take shape during this
period. A Constitutionalist Party, made up of elite landowners, rich businessmen,
heads of industry, and top civil servants also attempted to pressure the French to
withdraw from Vietnam. This organization, however, advocated a peaceful
strategy of economic pressure, but suffered from the same shortcoming as the
earlier party's noted. It too did not involve the masses, and therefore was unable
to garner support outside of its already limited client base. 33 The decline of both
of these early political organizations, however, coincided with the emergence of a
new force in Vietnamese domestic politics that of a growing worker class.
Due in large part to French economic practices put in place to support the
material needs of World War I, for the first time, a working class was developing
in Vietnam. It was made up of factory, textile, and mill workers, who were
gaining a sense of self-awareness while growing in numbers, which in turn gave
them additional political strength. By 1925, the workers, who were for the most
part still unorganized, were only able to influence issues at the local level.
Despite their local nature, however, they proved themselves to be a formidable
opponent by conducting several successful wildcat strikes against the French
colonial administration and individual businesses. 34
33
Duiker, pp 135-138 and 184-186.
34One such strike was in August of 1925 by workers belonging to an underground
union at the Ba Son naval arsenal in Saigon-Cholon, under the guise of requesting higher
wages, but was actually a show of support for striking Chinese workers. The strikers
were able to block the deployment of two warships the French authorities wanted to
27
Emboldened by what they saw taking place among the working class, two
new groups attempted to set up viable mass oriented political parties in Vietnam.
The first was started in 1925 by Ho Chi Minh and was called the Association of
Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth (RYL) - Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong
Chi Hoi. 35 The second was founded in December of 1927 by Nguyen Thai Hoc,
a teacher from a Vietnamese peasant family in Hanoi and was called the
Vietnamese Nationalists Party - Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang - (VNQDD). 36 Both
the RYL and the VNQDD were strong national movements with broad support
from all classes of people. 37 Their formation, capitalized on a general sense of
unrest present in Vietnam, caused in part by the worsening of global economic
conditions and also by the already intolerable living conditions of the peasant and
working classes.
When the effects of the worldwide depression began to be felt at home,
French investors withdrew their money from Vietnam. Correspondingly, workers
send to Shanghai to end the Chinese strike. In November to this same year, flush with
their success, these same workers held a massive rally to protest the arrest of Phan Boi
Chau in Shanghai. See Vietnam: A Country Study , p. 40.
35To get the money he needed to start this organization, Ho betrayed his youth idol




France's attempt to reassert its authority over IndoChina in 1946-1946 effectively
eliminated this group as a rival to the Communists. Once the VNQDD was gone, the
Viet Minh remained without rivals. See J.L.S. Girling, People's War: Conditions and
Consequences in China and South East Asia, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1969), p. 13.
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salaries fell by 30 - 50 percent, and full time employment dropped by
approximately 33 percent in Vietnam. The international market prices of rice,
rubber, and coal - Vietnam's only cash crops - plummeted in value. French
fortunes were lost over night and business empires lay in ruin, but in the end, as
always, it was the Vietnamese peasant who bore most of the burden. 38 Because
of the hyper-inflation that followed he was forced to give up twice as much of his
crop, just to pay the same amount of taxes or other debts. This man made
disaster was compounded by series of monsoon induced floods which caused
widespread famine and food riots throughout the countryside as farmers refused to
give up even greater shares of their crops to taxation. 39
All of these factors only served to further fan the flames of Vietnamese
resistance to domination, French or otherwise. The age old Vietnamese desire for
independence had yet to be extinguished by any would be conqueror. Numerous
small rebel groups had maintained a constant spirit of rebellion since the start of
the colonial period. They, like their predecessors under the rule of China, did not
shrink from violence when it appeared necessary or useful. 40 The groundwork
was being laid during this time for the emergence of the communists as the first
true "revolutionary" organization. It appeared in the form of the Indochinese
38Ho Chi Minh, "On the Condition of the Peasants in Vietnam", as cited in Ho Chi




Communist Party (ICP). The ICP was formed from a number of smaller
organizations, including the RYL, by Ho as an attempt to gain greater influence
over the liberation movements already underway in varies parts of Vietnam.
Under one or more of its varies forms, the ICP was able to operate in the open
during the first fourteen or so years of its existence. 41 There were periods of
crackdown by French authorities when the party was associated with violent
strikes or insurrection. Many of its early leaders spent many years in prison for
purely political reasons. World events were soon to force the ICP on a course not
of its own choosing, but one that would eventually lead it to victory.
There was but one factor missing to begin the final revolution, a common
foe. One whom all Vietnamese, regardless of social class, religion, or ethnic
background could acknowledge as illegitimate. Fate would soon deliver this last
requirement to Ho in the form of the Japanese.
C. WORLD WAR II
On 10 August 1939, Germany and Russia signed a non-aggression pact.
This act gave the French administrators an excuse to declare all communist
organizations illegal and further crackdown on opposition political and labor
41The founding conference of the first Indochinese Communist Party (ICP, Dang Cong
San Dong Duong) was held on 17 June 1929, in Hanoi. On 3 February 1930 Ho Chi
Minh presided over the meeting were the unified Vietnamese Communist Party (Viet
Nam Cong San Dang) VCP was founded. The name was later changed back to the
Indochinese Communist Party. See Duiker, pp. 211-214.
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forces in Vietnam. 42 This turn of events forced the ICP to shift the focus of its
activities from the urban industrial centers to the countryside, where French
administrative control was significantly weaker. Because of the need to build the
widest possible base of support for their cause, throughout the war years, the
communists adopted a strategy that welcomed support from the middle class and
even the landlord class. However, it was made very clear by Uncle Ho that the
primary focus of the party would remain tied to the needs of the Vietnamese
peasant class. 43
After the French surrender in June of 1940, the Japanese demanded access
to Vietnamese ports, military facilities, and the right to transport troops via
Vietnamese rail systems to any destination they desired. In return for these
privileges, the Japanese would recognize Vichy French authority and
administration of IndoChina. 44 As the Vichy French reestablished control and the
Japanese moved their forces into Vietnam, ICP organizations and their sister
"military" units retreated to safe areas in the mountains and swamps. In these safe
areas, they refined their political ideology, recruited and trained a new generation
of political cadre, regrouped units that had been attrited by combat, and began a
series of small coordinated attacks against both the French and the Japanese. All
of these activities were designed to build a base of legitimacy among the
42Vietnam, A Country Study , p. 45.
43Ho, On Revolution, pp. 130-132.
44Vietnam, A Country Study , pp. 45-47.
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population for the mass uprising that would eventually come, which would
naturally be lead by a vanguard ICP. 45
D. EARLY POLITICAL-MILITARY UNITS
During the first few years of the war, most of the paramilitary organizations
fighting the French and Japanese were no more than armed guerrilla bands. They
tended to be composed predominately of ethnic minority groups who were for the
first time being integrated with the political refugees forced to take sanctuary in
the highlanders traditional homelands. 46 The Japanese occupation of Vietnam,
provided the ICP with the missing ingredient it required to establish itself as the
sole true defender of Vietnamese nationalistic spirit. To accomplish this aim,
however, the ICP would have to now integrate the traditional forces of
nationalism, united struggle against foreign invaders, and the rebellious nature of
the Vietnamese peasant class into a coordinated strategy.
Ho and his key supporters decided the only way to accomplish their goals
was to temporarily set aside their more radical socialist goals and out of necessity
placed the struggle for national independence ahead of all other concerns. This
was done in order to gain the broad based support they knew they would need in
order to first hold out against the Japanese then defeat the French. To accomplish





(Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minn Hoi) or "Viet Minh". The true value of the Viet
Minh was as a front organization for the ICP. Unlike the ICP, the Viet Minh was
able to win the support of the other patriotic elements (like the Army of National
Salvation) already operating in various parts of Vietnam. Despite operating under
a different name, the Viet Minh would be under the complete control and
direction of the ICP. This was accomplished by appointing ICP members to all
key Viet Minh leadership positions.
Ho and his "military" advisor Vo Nguyen Giap47 also realized that
conducting guerrilla warfare type operations alone would not accomplish their
goal. What they needed was a way to combine both of their main objectives -
socialist education of the masses and military defeat of the Japanese and French.
Following the lead of his ideological brother to the north, Mao Zadong, Ho
described his philosophy for the Viet Minh as follows:
Political action is more important than military action; propaganda is more
important than fighting. 48
With this in mind, Giap began setting up Viet Minh self defense forces in all
villages under their control, under the direct supervision of the party. 49 They also
decided to set up a secure base of operations near Cao Bang. 50 This area was






Refer to Map 2.
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chosen because it combined of the advantage of easily defendable terrain with
proximity to a secure logistics support base, southern China. It served as a
political-military indoctrination site from which trained cadre and military units
would be sent out to operate in areas under French or Japanese control. These
new "politically configured" military units were called Armed Propaganda
Teams. 51 They were specifically designed to do mobilization work in remote
villages but were also capable of engaging enemy units in combat if necessary.
They operated under the "propaganda of the deed" concept in order to gain the
support of the masses, Uncle Ho deemed so necessary to a successful revolution.
These independently operating forces were later united by Giap into what
was called the Vietnam Liberation Army (VLA), the precursor of the modern
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), 52 so as to downplay the role of the
nationalists. By 1944, Ho and Giap were in complete control of the Viet Minh.
During this period, the ICP continued to expand its political base of support
throughout the country by establishing a series of National Salvation Associations
(NSA's). 53 These organizations targeted specific segments of the population,




"Douglas Pike explains the term in the following manner: "The term national
salvation (cuu quoc) has special emotive qualities for all Vietnamese. It was the
organizing instrument used to rally support against French and then the Japanese in
World War II. Many of the resistance movements in Vietnam today employ the term in
their names." See Pike, pp. 24-25 and p. 37.
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the independence movement without leaving the social mainstream or entering
into direct combat. Ho understood the need for broad based support both in the
active and passive resistance movement.
As the end of World War II became more apparat, the ICP began to make
plans for the final mass revolt that would carry them to victory and independence.
The conditions in Vietnam were only now right for a mass uprising, famine had
gripped the countryside and unemployment was rampant in the cities. Mass
unrest caused by unsuitable living conditions was growing due to the weakness of
the Japanese position. Shortly after the dropping of the second atomic bomb on
Japan, the ICP issued a call for a general uprising.
54 Within one week of the
uprising, most of the provincial capitals in the north were under the control of ICP
factions. On 28 August 1945, the formation of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV) was announced. Ho Chi Minh would become both President and
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Vo Nguyen Giap, his chief military strategist
throughout the struggle, was to become Minister of the Interior. The highest
political and the highest military leaders, all of whom belonged to the ICP, would
now begin to shape the new Vietnamese state.
On 2 September 1945, President Ho read the Vietnamese Declaration of
Independence to a crowd of over half a million supports, closing with a request to
the allied powers to recognize the right of the Vietnamese to self rule and
54To review the text of this speech, refer to Ho Chi Minh, On Revolution, pp. 141
142.
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independence. 55 Thus the first combined political-military revolution in
Vietnamese history ended, with the mass uprising all previous revolutionary
leaders had sought. The conclusion of hostilities between the Vietnamese and the
Japanese, however, was only a prelude to an even greater struggle to come.
E. SUMMARY
As the preceding pages show, the Revolutionary Professional Soldier ethos
did not spring from whole cloth overnight like the revolutions that took place in
Russia, China, and Israel. Unlike the revolutions cited in the Perlmutter and
LeoGrande work, where the entire prior history of the society was wiped away
overnight by the revolution, in Vietnam many aspects of the Vietnamese society
already conformed to the socialist structure, and accordingly remained in place
after the revolution. The development of the Revolutionary Professional Soldier
ethos was not only a product of the communist revolution, but of thousands of
years of physical and cultural domination and struggle. It was in fact born of both
organic Vietnamese beliefs that were later molded by modern socialist
organizational structures.
The first political and military units to begin striving toward the goal of
Vietnamese independence were unorganized, lacked a coherent strategy, and had
only limited regional or class based support. These groups eventually were
eliminated by French authorities or other rival groups. However, with each
"Ibid, pp. 143-145.
36
generation that passed, their operations became more sophisticated and
successful. Finally culminating with the formation and emergence of the
Vietnamese Communist Party, albeit under a series of different names and
operational structures.
F. CONCLUSIONS
It was during this period of history that the foundation of the Revolutionary
Professional Soldier concept took shape in Vietnam. One can only discuss the
"concepts" as there was no formal civil or military structures in existence to
analyze. A party had formed, but was one of clandestine illegitimate operations.
In this respect, a military did exist, but was little more than a collection of armed
teams with a mission of propaganda, not combat. Despite these structural
shortcomings, Ho and Giap were able to stoke the fires of nationalism in the
hearts of the population and bring Socialism to Vietnam, under the guise of
independence.
With these historical influences in mind, I will now conduct an examination
of the nature of the Party-Military relations in post independence Vietnam using
the model outlined in Chapter II. For it is only with an understanding of the
events of past, can one understand the present situation in Vietnam.
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V. THE PERIOD OF CIVIL-MILITARY EVOLUTION
This chapter is an attempt to discern the specific nature of the civil-military
relationship manifest during three critical periods of Vietnamese history which I
call - the Struggle for Liberation - 1944 to 1954, the Period of National
Unification and Consolidation - 1955 to 1982, and the Period of Reform - 1983 to
1993. Each period is analyzed in accordance with the specific type of civil-
military relationship, defined in Chapter II, I feel most closely resembles that of
the Vietnamese experience.
A. THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION: A FUSED RELATIONSHIP
In their writings, Perlmutter and LeoGrande state that the Fused relationship
only applies to states that have combined the function of vanguard military with
that of subservient political organization, as is the ideal case study the Cuban
Revolution. 56 I contend, however, that a Fused relationship can also apply to
states that combine a vanguard political element with a subservient military
organization as in the case of Vietnam. 57 The key issue is not whether the
political institution is dominant over the others, for that is a basic component of
all three types of relationships, but rather that the functions of both have been
56Perlmutter and LeoGrande, pp. 785-786.
57This author had the opportunity to discuss this specific issue with Dr
William LeoGrande on 1 June 1994, at American University. He concurred with
the definition as presented in the following paragraphs.
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"fused" into one institution which then executes both political and military
missions.
From the beginning of the Struggle for Liberation, all the way up to the
closing days of the conflict, the specific nature of the civil-military relationship
manifest was characteristic of that found in the Fused relationship I have defined.
Specifically, in relation to the exceedingly low potential for conflict between
political and military actors with in the movement. This was due in large
measure to the fact that all of the key political and military elites shared - a
common historical/cultural background, philosophical link to communist ideology,
and a common goal of independence from France. 58
In addition to these factors, there were no expressed political-military
boundaries and little differentiation between the civil and military elements of the
communist "state". 59 This finding is based on three specific observations made
during the analysis process - 1) a noted lack of a military separate from the forces
created by and functioning within the hegemonic Marxist-Leninist party, 2) the
initial political organization that took power during the August Revolution was
incapable of fulfilling the duties of state administrator and defender of the
58William S. Turley, "Origins and Development of Communist Military
Leadership in Vietnam," in Armed Forces and Society . Vol. 3, No. 2. February
1977, pp. 223-225.
59During the period immediately following the end of World War II, the term
"state" is a misnomer. The party organization was more a movement than a set of
institutions. This would not change significantly until 1954, when the party
consolidated its position.
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homeland on the national scale, and 3) the actions of the party within the territory
it controlled were in fact more praetorian than Leninist.
This contention can be seen clearly in the role played by the party in the
development of a military strategy totally focused on political objectives, the
historical background of top party officials who were first political leaders and
second military commanders, the party's control over the class based requirements
for selection of military officers, and the introduction of political cadre directly
into the military chain of command. The military forces that came into existence
during this period were creations of the party used initially for internal security,
but later given a role in the armed expansion of the ideology. 60 This point is
made clear by the fact that the 1959 Democratic Republic of Vietnam constitution
did not even contain a heading for the armed forces. In fact, only one article,
Article 8, mentioned the duties the armed forces were to perform. It reads:
... to safeguard the gains of the revolution and defend the independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the Fatherland, and freedom,
happiness, and peaceful labor of people61
The communists may have seized power in the vacuum left by the defeated
Japanese during the August Revolution, but neither the party nor the military had
attained the level of sophistication required to either administer or defend the
newly independent state of Vietnam. Having operated solely in isolated areas of
60Quang Vinh, "Birth of the People's Army Recounted", Vietnamese. No. 1,
January 1974, pp. 82-89.
^Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
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the countryside, overseeing the daily administration of villages and small rural
districts in no way prepared the party to take on the responsibility of running an
economically ravaged, agriculturally bankrupt, and ideologically divided state.
Their lack of educated, skilled, and trained individuals to hold the offices of state
left open by refugees fleeing southward, under the protection of Article 2 of the
Geneva Agreements, 62 and party imposed restrictions on the political
trustworthiness of those individuals who stayed behind, taxed their already low
pool of talent. Simply being the first one into the cities in no way imbues an
organization with the talents and abilities required to administer the offices of
state. This was as true for the Vietnamese as it was for Castro's 26 of July
movement.
The last factor deals less with the potential capabilities of the party and more
with the objective actions it took during the administration of the territories under
its direct control. In this regard, one develops a much less Utopian view of the
living conditions in party controlled areas than that presented in party literature. I
contend that the praetorian 63 aspects far outweighed the Leninist ones and despite
the "hearts and minds" campaign waged by the communist forces in the rural
"Marvin E. Gettleman, Vietnam: History, Documents, and Opinions. (New
York: Signet, 1970), p. 164.
"Specifically. I am referring to the actions of the Praetorian moderator type of
military. In this case the Viet Minh portrayed themselves as saviors, promising to
remedy and rectify past failures. See Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics:
Military Coups and Governments, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 22-
24.
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areas, not all operations were focused on peasant literacy and community
development. Routinely, individuals were required to gain permission from the
local party boss to travel outside the village area, contact with other communities
was strictly controlled, while agricultural production quotas and taxes were
established for each community as part of their support for the war effort.
Additionally, summary executions were the order of the day for suspected traitors
and those considered "disloyal" to the cause. Also, "Education" consisted of
ideological indoctrination and political awareness classes for every individual,
regardless of his or her place in society. Finally, forced or rather coerced
conscription was not an uncommon occurrence. Every facet of the lives of the
population in the "liberated zones" was orchestrated to somehow enhance "the
struggle", regardless of local sentiment. 64
Reviewed in their totality, the factors described above show the single
focused nature of a Fused civil-military relationship. As stated, the specific nature
of the civil-military relationship adjusts overtime to conform to both
environmental and political dimensions. Such was the case in Vietnam as the
fused relationship that had come into existence during the Struggle for Liberation
gave way to a further evolution of Vietnamese civil-military relations.
64Vietnam, A Country Study , pp. 105-107.
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B. THE PERIOD OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION AND CONSOLIDATION: A
SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP
If the period of Struggle for Liberation came to be noted for a absence of
expressed political-military boundaries and a lack of differentiation between the
civil and military elements of state, then the period that followed, the Period of
Unification and Consolidation, was remarkable for the degree of formalization that
took place in both the political and military institutions of the newly independent
North Vietnamese state. For the first time, a symbiotic civil-military relationship
became apparent in Vietnam during the 1955 to 1982 time frame. It is during
this period that the military institution is for the first time discernable as a viable
entity unto itself, and not simply a sub-functional element of a single hegemonic
institution present in Vietnam, the communist party. This had not been the case
during either the conduct of the resistance movement of World War II or the
Struggle for Liberation against the French. 65
Following the breakdown of the Geneva Agreements and the tit-for-tat
recognition of both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of
Vietnam by their respective Cold War patrons, the informal structure of both the
party and the military were reorganized to match their new standing as official
government institutions with in the framework of an independent sovereign state.
Gone were the days when small ill trained and under equipped bands of men
65Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam", in Civil-Military Relations. (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, Publishers, 1987), p. 235.
43
operated from clandestine basecamps in remote areas of the countryside in
support of political objectives. Both the party and the military now had specific
duties to perform and were thus required to take on the trappings of overt public
servants.
66
In the years immediately following the Struggle for Liberation, the party
embarked on a program to not just solidify their dominant position, but rather one
intended to revolutionize the very socioeconomic structure of the state. The focus
of the program was ideological in nature, but its primary motivation was,
however, economic. 67
The program involved the creation of a totally new social structure. It was
for the first time in Vietnamese history a true revolution. The party did not simply
aim at changing the faces of the individuals holding the top leadership positions
in the Vietnamese government, but instead focused on changing the very fabric of
society. To accomplish this goal, all of the top party leaders appointed to the
different state institutions had to cooperate with each other, while simultaneously
creating a position for their own institution in the overall structure of the emerging
socialist revolutionary state. During this period an atmosphere of mutual benefit
66
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67Nguyen Van Canh, Vietnam Under Communism, 1975-1982
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prevailed. This was due to many reasons, a few of which were related to internal
economic conditions faced by post war Vietnam. 68
It is then in this period of ideological fervor, nationalistic zeal, and political
necessity that the characteristics of a symbiotic relationship were born. The
following is a description of the aspects of the Vietnamese experience that cause
this period to be associated with the symbiotic model.
In the social sciences, symbiosis means an organizational; structure with
specialized functions that are related to one another in a division of labor.
Symbiotic interaction is on all institutional levels, whereas a coalitional is
rather restricted to the top elites. Symbiotic also implies modifications of
each other's behavior for purposes of sustenance and survival; it is
reciprocally advantageous and binds structures of different functions. 69
The Vietnamese civil-military relationship during the 1955 to 1982 period,
meets these most basic requirements cited above. Additionally, although more
structured and formal than the previous Fused type, civil-military relations during
this period tended to take a more organic approach to inter-institutional relations
than the coalitional period that followed. The symbiotic relationship that
developed was a system of governance that placed the benefit of the revolutionary
ideology ahead of the potential benefits of each institution. The three institutions
of state developed a partnership ethos interacting with one another under the
constant guidance of the party. The analysis that follows builds on these general
themes as it details specific instances of interaction in Vietnam during this period.
68Ho, On Revolution, pp. 290-297.
69Perlmutter and LeoGrande, p. 784.
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During the inter-war period (1955-1963), key leadership roles with in the
bureaucracy, the party, and the military continued to be held by the same small
group of individuals that had orchestrated the Struggle for Liberation against the
French. 70 Because none of the group were what could be classified as
"professional soldiers or statesmen", other than perhaps Ho Chi Minh due to his
extensive political education, there was a very low level of difference between
military and nonmilitary elites. The core decision making body had all begun as
political activists who, out of necessity, had taken up arms to support the party in
its struggle. This small core group held all of the key posts in the party, the
bureaucracy, and the military.
A second aspect relates to the theme of interrelatedness addressed above.
Despite the presence of three functional institutions of state, their spheres of
interest and functional specialties were not clearly defined. The party held a
preeminent position among the institutions of state administration and national
defense, of this there can be no doubt. It was the party, through the Plenum and
Party Congresses that developed, wrote, and prepared all the laws, economic
plans, and social welfare programs for Vietnam. However, the simplistic structure
of the institutions, a lack of trained "politically correct" personnel, as well as the
overlapping roles and missions of the three agencies combined to further obscure
what few boundaries had developed.
70Thayer, pp. 238-239.
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Because of the shortage of trained personnel, the circulation of individuals
between military and nonmilitary posts was a free flowing affair. Not only for the
reasons stated above, but also because the demands placed on military and
nonmilitary leaders during this period were not significantly greater than those
they had faced during the Struggle for Liberation. Military tactics still involved the
use of small units, operating in support of political goals in unchallenged regions
of Vietnam. Throughout this period, the technological pace of the war remained
primitive by western standards, despite the introduction of modern Soviet and US
weapons systems into the theater. 71 The leaders of the movement during this
period had earned their places in society, the military, and the party structure by
completing a test of fire against the French. They had first established their
ideological credentials, then proven themselves in combat. Now they had
military expertise to back up their ideological prowess. Following the party's
"Red vs Expert" 72 line of thinking, there was nothing such men could not do.
71
Specifically, armor, rocket artillery, airplanes, and antiaircraft missile
systems.
72This is yet another aspect of the Chinese experience the Vietnamese adapted
to their situation. Red refers to the desired level of ideological loyalty an
individual is expected to attain with in the political sphere. Expert refers to the
level of tactical and technical proficiency that an individual is expect to attain in
order to perform his military or administrative duties. The ideal is an individual
who combines both qualities, but if one must be stressed over the other, in the
mind of the revolutionary, it is better to be Red than Expert. See Vo Nguyen
Giap, Banner of the People's War, the Party's Military Line , (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1970), pp. 38-39.
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It was during this period that the military was for the first time assigned a
"Dual Role". 73 In addition to its mission of protecting the state from invasion, the
military was assigned economic construction and production tasks as well.
Initially, due to a shortage of personnel, all state farms were placed under the
control of the military. Military specialties were also matched to civilian
equivalents in order to maximize the advantage of each institution. In this line,
combat engineer units were sent out to repair roads and bridges while Infantry
units put their vast pool of labor to use in community public work efforts.
Military officers were also assigned to fill vacant billets in the state bureaucracy
with increasing frequency. 74 In brief, the military was being trained to handle the
defense of the nation along orthodox lines, while simultaneously playing a leading
role in the economic and administrative development of Vietnam. This was due
to its position as the largest repository of skilled manpower and material in
Vietnam, all the while commanded by a dual military/party chain of command.
Despite this dual role, the military's primary task was still national defense.
This task soon took on a new significance due to the activities of the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia and the large quantities of military training and equipment
being provided by the Soviet Union. Additionally, because of the Vietnam
invasion of Cambodia and the ill treatment of the Chinese minority in Vietnam,
73
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military and economic aid from China to Vietnam decreased drastically during this
period. All Chinese aid ended as a result of the 1979 border war between
Vietnam and China. 75
To make up for this loss of foreign aid, Vietnam developed closer ties to the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union became both Vietnam's largest economic trading
partner and supplier of military equipment and training assistance. 76 The presence
of Soviet military and political advisors in Vietnam, combined with the large
numbers of Vietnamese officials being sent to study in the Soviet Union, had a
tremendous impact on the next type of civil-military relationship to develop in
Vietnam.
In order to match its new legitimate status, the military became more
conventional in appearance. To support the new equipment, ever increasing
amounts of training time were given over to military science and technical
studies. For the first time, a system of military rank was established and insignia
to denote each rank was worn by military forces, 77 gone were the days of "leaders
and followers". The military also became more hierarchical and centralized in
order to support the larger and more powerful heavy divisions and corps sized
units that were organized. 78
75Vietnam: A Country Study , pp. 176-177.
76
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The last factor concerns the Vietnamese experiences of the late 1970's and
early 1980's. The level of integration and cooperation found in the symbiotic
type of civil-military relationship is very difficult to sustain after the revolution
ends. This was the case in Vietnam for several reasons. Specifically, without a
common enemy to focus the energies of the population against, ethnic, religious,
ideological, and class distinctions once again came to the fore. 79 Additionally,
with in the institutions of state, competition for ever scarcer resources caused
institutional boundaries to appear and the circulation of elites between the
institutions at all levels of government became more difficult. This too was due to
a number of factors including, the increasing demands placed on key leaders in
all three institutions by the technological revolution that hit Vietnam. The more
sophisticated Vietnam became in terms of the international economic and regional
security policies it advocated, the more the individuals tasked to institute these
policies had to increase their personal level of sophistication. For the Vietnamese
economy to operate effectively, both the requirement and the personnel to fill it,
had to grow at an equal rate. 80
During both the War of Unification and the beginning of the War of
Consolidation, the formal political and military institutions of the Vietnamese state
worked in unison to accomplish the primary objective of the conflict. However,
79Tran Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in Vietnam.
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp. 79-83.
80Vietnam: A Country Study , pp. 147-151
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the outcome of each war had a profoundly different impact on not only civil-
military relations but on the very soul of the nation as well. The successful
unification of the nation accomplished by defeating both the US and the Republic
of Vietnam, lifted the party and the military to new heights in the hearts and
minds of the population. In the minds of the party leaders, their historic victory at
unification, validated their brand of socialist revolutionary ideology. 81 The
invasion of Cambodia, although beginning with broad support, soon resulted in
social and ideological kayos that combined with a lack of economic development,
to cause the social position of both the party and the military to sink to new lows
in the eyes of the Vietnamese population. 82 The impact of this period on the
evolutionary process from a symbiotic type of civil-military relationship to the
present coalitional type is covered in the section that follows.
C. THE PERIOD OF REFORM: A COALITIONAL RELATIONSHIP
Building the country is closely linked with defending the country and
building socialism must be closely linked with protecting socialism. 83
If, as I contend, the two previous periods of Vietnamese civil-military
relations were characterized by a sense of "Revolutionary Spirit", then the Period
81
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82Van Canh, pp. 97-112.
"Lieutenant Colonel Luong Xuan Ba: "Organizing Militia, Self-Defense Forces
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51
of Reform that followed is characterized by a growing sense of war fatigue,
economic crisis, and ideological malaise. It is in this post-revolutionary period
that a redefinition of the civil-military relationship took place within the three
institutions of the Vietnamese socialist state. The symbiotic type of relationship
that had existed during the Period of National Unification and Consolidation in
turn evolved into a more formal coalitional type of civil-military relationship. The
reasons for this movement up the continuum of civil-military evolution proceed
from a fundamental shift in the nature of the relationship between the three
institutions of state.
As in all "revolutionary states", in the period after the revolution ends, it
becomes increasing difficult to sustain the same high levels of discipline and
ideological fervor that had existed during the height of the revolution. However,
the Vietnam experience is very different from that of the Soviet Union and China,
in that the revolution continued for over 40 years. When the party could no,
longer find an enemy that would cause the population to fear for its survival,
ideological disillusionment began to appear at a much faster pace. It was during
this period of uncertainty that both formal and informal challenges to the status
quo began to appear. In the formal realm, institutional boundaries solidified due
to the complexity of managing a modern state. Additionally, because of an
increasing division of labor among the three institutions of state in Vietnam, the
circulation of elites at the middle and lower echelons ended as the technical skills
of both military and civilian bureaucrats increased to meet new economic and
52
military threats. In both cases the types of training and skills required to qualify
an individual to serve in one institution, were unavailable to individuals in the
other institutions.
This then created a relationship of mutual benefit as each institution
concentrated its efforts and resources on those areas within its area of expertise
and relied on the other institutions to do the same. 84 At the very top, the party
leadership, coordinated the efforts of all three institutions for the overall benefit of
the state. Thus, the relationship of the military institution to the political structure
was one of growing independence, albeit a contentious one. It is during this
period that the primary concern of the military and bureaucratic institutions
become a desire for greater autonomy from the party, while the party's primary
interest was in maintaining its preeminent position in both the social and
governmental hierarchy.
Issues concerning the nature of the Vietnamese socialist state also came
under increasing scrutiny, but under a more informal basis. At the core of the
informal relationship between the party, the military, and the bureaucracy was the
maintenance of elite status. The existence of elites in a classless society may be
an oxymoron, but these individuals were well aware of the fact that the benefits
and advantages they enjoyed would significantly decrease if one institution was to
be absorbed by another. Additionally, with the loss of the "imperialist invaders",
84
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the necessity of maintaining a large standing military, active and reserve forces,
came under increasing fire. It is also during this period that a changing of the
guard takes place. Individuals who had proven themselves indispensable during
the revolution now found themselves relics of a bygone era. Young well
educated technocrats begin to appear on the scene and the older ideologist's were
forced from the scene.85
Beginning in 1979, the party leadership effectively abandoned it's 1976-
1980 Five Year Plan. This signalled the end of the disastrous post-unification
program of socialist industrialization which had envisioned a future for Vietnam
where the North would serve as the industrial base and the South as the
agricultural heartland. It soon became clear, however, that the collectivisation
and industrialization program had failed due weaknesses within the core
personnel structure of the party. Because of their lack of expertise, the program
had been engineered prematurely, without the necessary preliminary
strengthening of the peasant agriculture economy which occupied some 90
percent of the population and was doomed to failure from the start. 86
Despite some sporadic successes, the implementation of Vietnam's new
economic schemes by the party proceeded slowly and poorly. The willingness of
the people to endure continued economic hardship in a non-revolutionary period
"Jonathan Luxmoore, Vietnam: The Dilemmas of Reconstruction, (London:
The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983), p. 16.
86Vietnam: A Country Study , p. 151
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was coming to an end. Despite food production remaining at a roughly substance
level for most of 1981, food riots broke out in several villages. 87 This was the
warning the moderates in the government had been waiting for. In the early part
of this same year, several senior civilian and military leaders were forced to step
down. Despite the best efforts of the party to hide the facts, the true failed nature
of the economic reform program was revealed by IMF figures, which showed a
fall in Vietnam's per capita GNP in real terms from US$241 in 1976 to US$153
in 1980. 88
While differences emerged over the question of Soviet access to Vietnamese
naval facilities, relations with China and the Kampuchean impasse created further
uncertainties in Vietnamese foreign policy. A more immediate problem, however,
related to Soviet foreign aid. The Soviets Union had become increasingly
reluctant to provide continued economic and military aid at the same levels it had
in previous years. Vietnam, now cut off from all international aid due to its
continued occupation of Cambodia, had become increasingly dependant on
Soviet aid to stabilize its economy. The Soviet's actions were considered to be a
major factor in the tentative economic readjustments which took place during the
87According to a United Nations estimate of early 1982, 45 percent of the
Vietnamese population was under-nourished. See Thayer, p. 257.
88Accompanying factors in this economic decline had been: the end of
Chinese and non-communist aid after the Cambodian invasion, the accompanying
diversion of precious resources to occupied Laos and Kampuchea, a series of
disastrous harvests, and a cutback in western trade. See International Monetary
Fund Country Report: Vietnam 1982.
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1978 to 1981 period. 89 Once Vietnam's 1981-1985 Five Year Plan got underway,
the absence of a long-term Soviet commitment to Vietnam's economic
development presented state economic planners with a number of significant
problems. 90
Of all of the institutions in Vietnam undergoing transformation, the party
was the one institution to feel the greatest negative impact of this change in
public perception. The deadlock in Cambodia, the failed ideological and
economic integration of the south, the growing dependance on Soviet foreign aid,
and ever increasing economic hardships all had an impact on the image of the
party, its unity, and the morale of the cadre members. A major review of the
party's membership took place during this period and in less than three years over
300,000 members had been dismissed for a variety of offenses ranging from
corruption to ideological disloyalty. Taking advantage of this opportunity, a
number of influential bureaucracy and military officials recommended a number
of reform measures. These measures included the retirement of ineffective and
incompetent leaders, especially older officials lacking adequate experience of
peacetime administration, and a full overhaul of the bureaucratic process. This is
89 Duiker, pp. 110-111
90
ln his report to the Fifth VCP Congress of March 1982 Party Secretary
General Le Duan praised the Soviet Union's past economic and military aid.
However, no reference was made to future material aid, and the resulting lack of
a clear-cut Soviet commitment was sufficient to forestall the passage of any major
economic resolutions. See Luxmoore, pp. 16-17.
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an example of the growing trend toward factional conflict being played out in
public between institutional groups. The discontentment of the population is
being used as a basis to bring conflict that had remained within the party
organization out in the open. 91
All of the factors described so far combined to make the Fifth Party
Congress, held in March of 1982, the most important one to date. The actions
taken both during and after the conference fundamentally altered the leadership
structure of the government and the political role of the military in Vietnam. This
reorientation of the socialist revolutionary concept in Vietnam was taken to secure
its internal economic and physical survival. It also had the effect of solidifying the
coalitional type of civil-military relationship that had begun to shape.
The most significant development of the congress, from a coalitional type of
relationship perspective, was a series of high-level "changing of the guard" moves
that took place. Of the eleven member Politburo, the top five members
continued to hold their positions, but the remaining six were all replaced. Most
prominent being General Vo Nguyen Ciap, at the time he was the Council of
Ministers vice-chairman. 92 Of the six new appointees to the Politburo, were two
91
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92Ciap was not totally removed from his leadership role, he kept his position
as a second Deputy Premier on the Central Committee, and his chairmanship of
the Science and Technology Commission. See Luxmoore, p. 16.
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young technocrats from the south. 93 One individual of specific interest to current
Vietnamese politics was Vo Van Kiet, who now serves as the Premier of Vietnam.
The emergence of an increasingly independent state bureaucracy also
impacted Vietnamese civil-military relations. 94 As the State Assembly became
more powerful in the operations of government at the national level, so to did the
province and district level organizations. They demanded and won concessions
in both the political and economic realms. One such concession included the
selection of individuals to run for public office. During this period, candidates
where, for the first time, chosen by the local organizations and not from approved
party member rosters. 95
The military also had to adjust to changes in public perception during this
period to maintain its high level of esteem in the greater Vietnamese society. To
maintain its influence in both society and the government, new adversaries, both
internal and external, and new responsibilities within the economic and social
realms had to be found. The military had come into existence during the
revolution and had, out of both desire and necessity, become a important part of
both Vietnam's economic and social infrastructure. Now that the revolution was
over, it has to compete for funds against social and economic development
93
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programs. Additionally, the public perception of military service is undergoing
revision. The military is no longer seen as the fastest and best means of social
improvement. Living conditions within the military are poor and the rigors of
service are not as acceptable now that an atmosphere of peace prevails in the
region. The competition being waged from the blossoming private sector to
attract the best and brightest of Vietnam's youth is being lost by the military. 96
These factors are of specific concern to the future development of Vietnam and
are covered in more detail in the next chapter.
Attempts by the military and the bureaucracy to increase their level of
autonomy vis-a-vis the party coincided with the demise of communist regimes in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 97 In insure their own survival, the party has
attempted to increase its influence over the bureaucracy and the military in the
last few years. The most significant of these measures from the civil-military
standpoint are the changes that were made to the 1992 Constitution of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The two previous constitutions of 1959 and 1980,
assigned the armed forces such traditional duties as:
...being duty bound to remain combat ready to defend the national
independence, sovereignty, political security and public order, territorial
integrity and unity against foreign aggression, and safeguard the gains of the
revolution.




Unlike the constitutions cited above, the new constitution also assigns the
armed forces additional tasks. Specifically Article 45 of the new state charter
reads:
The people's armed forces shall be absolutely loyal to the fatherland and
the people; are duty bound to remain combat ready to defend national
independence, sovereignty, security and public order, as well as territorial
unification and integrity; defend the socialist regime and revolutionary
gains; and join with the entire people in national conscription.
The inclusion of this new phrase is an indication of the level of concern found at
the top of the party leadership structure. It is also an indication as to the
increased bargaining power of the military over the party concerning issues of
specific military interest. Additionally, with this new constitutional mandate, the
military's role as protector of the Communist Party is assured.
The last issue impacting the development of a coalitional type of civil-
military relationship concerns the elimination of the "Dual Command" structure
within the military. This structure refers to the role played by political cadre
officers in tactical military units. 98 From its inception, the armed forces have been
commanded by both political and military officers. During this period, the
military used its increased public prestige and economic leverage over the party to
have the Dual Command system eliminated. This was partly a factor of
institutional autonomy and partly due to the tactical failure of the Cambodian




indoctrination, on the modern battlefield, the goal is mass destruction of opposing
force. In this new environment, military units live and die by split second
decision making. To survive and win, a streamlined, highly competent, and
tactically proficient military officer is called for under the Soviet style military the
Vietnamese adopted. The division of labor had finally caught up to the dual
command officer system. As of late, some political leaders have begun discussing
the possibility of reestablishing the political officer within the military command
structure." Given the current moves toward more autonomous institutions of
state, this seems to be a remote possibility at this time.
D. SUMMARY
Throughout the Period of Civil-Military Evolution in Vietnam, transitions
from one type of civil-military relationship to another - from fused to symbiotic to
coalitional - were born of necessity not ideological expansionism. At the start of
this period, the very existence of Vietnam as a functioning state was the goal of
the revolution. Then unification became the rallying cry. Still later the survival of
the newly independent state was the cause of internal disarray and economic
failure. Throughout the period, however, the vast majority of the population
remained motivated by a combination of revolutionary tradition, cultural pride,
and desire for a better standard of living.
"Hollis Hebbel, "The Vietnamese Military's Changing Role", Southeast Asian
Affairs, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 371.
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During the fused phase, a single group of revolutionaries controlled and
coordinated the activities of the entire movement. Once established in legitimate
positions of authority, they begin to set up institutional structures to support their
own survival in addition to meeting the administrative needs of the state. This
symbiotic relationship, lead to the creation of barriers between the institutions,
albeit permeable ones. As the role of the state grew in response to the war effort,
so did the institutions tasked with providing both the men and equipment needed
to conduct the fight. This caused the development of nonpermeable institutional
boundaries and lead to the creation of a coalitional type relationship. As the pace
of modern warfare and complexities of state administration grew, so to did the
skills of individuals in each institution. Eventually, the degree of specialization
required in each institution became so high, that it is now impossible for
individuals to move between institutions. This has increased the institutional
autonomy of both the bureaucracy and the military vis-a-vis the party.
E. CONCLUSION
During the over thirty years of revolutionary struggle that make up the
Period of Civil-Military Evolution, the relationship between the bureaucracy, the
military, and the party grew into one of mutual benefit as each institution
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redefined its role in the governing process in terms of the economic and political
consequences of failure. 100
The final shift to the current coalitional type of civil-mrlitary relationship not
only brought greater autonomy to each institution but greater responsibility as
well. The military now has greater responsibility for economic issues of
importance to the state than in the previous periods, in addition to its traditional
role as protector of the state from all threats, foreign and domestic. To
accomplish these tasks, large numbers of high technology weapons systems were
introduced into the armed forces. To operate these weapons, a training base was
established that suited not only the increased skilled labor needs of the military,
but also the needs of an expanding civilian manufacturing sector as well.
The following quotation provides a glimpse in to the unique nature of the
current civil-military relationship and attempts to provide an additional
explanation as to why during such a tumultuous period of history so few instances
of public conflict have taken place:
The militia and self-defense forces (MSF) are the armed forces of the masses
and are closely linked with production, social life, and political movement at
the basic level. 101
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It is within this mind set that one must approach the issue of civil-military conflict.
The influence of the military in both the pollical and social realms is by virtue of
its enormous size alone significant. Despite the outward appearances of harmony,
behind the scenes their is yet another struggle taking place. This time over
competition for scarce resources and a growing desire for increased institutional
autonomy, not terrain. Yet, despite the outward claims, this author contends that
economics has been the driving force of the civil-military reform measures
instituted to date, not revolutionary ideology.
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VI. CIVIL-MILITARY CONFLICTS
This chapter concerns itself with the nature of the civil-military conflicts that
have been most common during the evolution of civil-military relations in
Vietnam. It has only been in recent years, that instances of civil-military conflict
have come to light in Vietnam. Some are the product of the rapid modernization
process taking place in Vietnam. While others are of a more fundamental nature
and center on the ideal nature of each institutions' place in the state as a
whole. 102 Each category that follows highlights a specific aspect of the Party-
Military institutional autonomy conflict.
A. REDEFINING BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL MEASURES
Throughout its modern history, the military has been controlled by the party
through a combination of social, emotional, ideological, and constitutional means.
The social aspects linking the military to the will of the people and the emotional
ties to the spirit of the revolution have not changed significantly since the end of
the revolution. However, the last two aspects, the ideological and constitutional
means have been significantly revised to support the growing fears of the party
that it too could fall from power like its East European ideological brothers.
Additionally, a link between the state bureaucracy based on the growing demands
102
Specifically, those involving measures intended to insure civilian control
over the military and issues involving the fundamental roles, missions, and
survival of both the party and the military as autonomous institutions.
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of economic reform has been extended to include bureaucratic oversight of
military affairs in the public service arena as well. 103 Both of these measures
combine to bring the daily operations of the military more in line with the needs
of the Vietnamese economy, and less towards military self-preservation.
Ideological and social indoctrination are inter-related and as such can be
used as an effective means of instilling a sense of duty and honor in the military
that constitutional or legislative control measures can not match. By portraying
the military as the servant of the people's will in historical, emotional, social, and
cultural terms, the party hopes to instill the value of loyalty to the party in the
hearts and minds of those who serve in the armed forces. This however, has not
proven to be the case. Since the end of the revolution ideological indoctrination
has had a different effect on the individuals serving in the military. Due to poor
living conditions most have become disillusioned with the socialist ideology, 104
not imbued with socialist spirit.
Conscription is another means by which the civilian institutions of state
attempt to exercise control over the military. Over the course of the past few
years, legislation concerning the length of service, the ages of eligibility, and
authorized deferments have been enacted into law. Most were designed to
eliminate the perception that conscription was only for the peasant classes as the




elites were able to escape their tour of duty. Other legislation has been passed to
make it more difficult to dodge the draft by taking legal action against the families
of those who fail to serve. While other measures provide economic incentives
and increased social status to the families of those soldiers serving in the
military. 105 All of these measures are designed to insure the ability of the military
to execute its new role as protector of the party. 106
B. MILITARY INTERESTS IN THE POLITICAL REALM
Competition for shares of an ever decreasing national budget rank as the
primary area of contention from the military perspective. 107 Other areas include
political interference in the promotion and assignment of senior and mid-grade
officers, and military end strength, specifically, legislation concerning conscription
and demobilization. As with all modern military's, communist and non-
communist alike, Vietnamese military leaders find themselves having to make
concessions between force structure, weapons procurement, and infrastructure
based on economic rather than security concerns. The military's ability to meet
the security missions assigned it have come into increasing conflict with social
welfare programs, economic reform measures, and public infrastructure
modernization.
105 Luxmoore, p. 1 7.
106Hebbel, "The Vietnamese Military's Changing Role", p. 364.
107Luxmoore, p. 16.
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The maintenance of the military's elite status is also a factor of current
conflict between the military and the party. While the party has been weeding
out the less than ideologically pure cadre members, it has been making up for lost
membership from among the ranks of the military. This renewed emphasis on the
politicalization of the military has met with considerable opposition from both the
military and some with in the party. Neither can decide what course Vietnam
should follow in terms of maintaining the benefits of institutional elite status.
It is with these facts in mind that the military leadership has taken one step
back from its program of professionalization. After years of attempting to distance
itself from the political process, disengagement from the political process is not
currently seen as being in the best interests of the military as an institution. It is
felt that to reduce military representation on the top party and state organizations
would be counter productive to the social and economic status of the military at
this critical time. 108
C. POLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE MILITARY REALM
Ideological concerns are at the forefront of this area. Driven by ever
increasing economic and political isolation and a growing determination to
preserve its dominant position, the party has begun to redefine the role of the
military in internal politics as a means to ensure its own survival. However, this
108 lnsight gained during personal interview conducted by this author with
several unidentified Vietnamese government officials.
68
bid to force the military to become more ideologically attuned, could falter if the
problems outlined in previous chapters of this thesis, which are both economic
and political in nature, continue to go unresolved. The civilian institutions are
very much aware of the critical role of the military in the implementing of general
socialist policy directives. Maintaining military cooperation in the economic
reform process underway is the only way the development of a market based
economy can take place in Vietnam. This cooperation, however, will have a
price. The autonomy enjoyed by the military has given it considerable leverage
with both the bureaucracy and the party. Where the compromise line will be
drawn has yet to be determined.
D. POTENTIAL FOR DIRECT INTERVENTION
Despite all of the areas of both potential and actual civil-military conflict
described above, the likelihood of direct military intervention in the governing
process via Coup d'etat is very low. Despite the fact that the party leadership
almost managed to destroy the state with its inept economic practices in the late
1980's, the military did not intervene in the governing process, This
unwillingness to take control of the state, despite the complete ineptitude shown
by the party leadership, is viewed, by this author, as a sign of the military's
support for the party and the process of civilian rule.
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E. SUMMARY
The continued appearance of articles in the Vietnamese media by senior
military officers on the evolving nature of civil-military relations, is an indication
of the internal debate taking place over the issue of repoliticalization of the
military and competition for resources. It is only during the coalitional period that
these disagreements have come out in public. During the two previous periods,
conflicts were resolved with in the party by the key leaders of each institution.
The current trend of public disagreement has alarmed some with in the party, as
the public support for the military seems to be higher than that enjoyed by the
party.
F. CONCLUSION
The proceeding analysis shows that civil-military conflicts have taken place
in the past and will continue to develop in Vietnam in the coming years. Thus, in
order to define the nature of current conflicts one must concentrate on the specific
issue, or issues, at the center of the conflict and the means used to resolve the
conflict. For these last issues are more enlightening to a Vietnam watcher than
the mere existence of conflict as an indicator of civil-military tension.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In attempting to describe the role of the military in the evolution of civil-
military relations in Vietnam, one should bear in mind William Turley's
admonishment that:
it is crucial in studying.. Vietnam to avoid making clear-cut distinctions
between civilian and military institutions, because the military is integrated
into the Party and State's administrative and decision making structure and
performs its political role legitimately. The (VPA) may be politically active,
it may be politically influential, even preponderant, but it cannot be called
politically dominant and much of its political presence is normal for the
109
regime.
It is with in this context that I contend that the evolution of civil-military
relations in Vietnam have been strongly influenced by geographical, historical,
cultural, and ideological aspects unique to the Vietnam case, although many
would disagree as to the exact nature of the influence each exerts.
As the preceding analysis shows, the Revolutionary Professional Soldier
theory as defined by Perlmutter and LeoGrande does not fully explain the
evolution of civil-military relations in Vietnam. Unlike the revolutions in Russia,
China, and Israel, the determinants of the Vietnamese revolution did not spring
from whole cloth overnight. Also, unlike the revolutions cited in the works of
109William S. Turley, "Army, Party, and Society in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam: Civil-Military Relations in a Mass-Mobilization Society", PH.D.
dissertation, University of Washington, 1972, p. 8.
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Perlmutter, LeoGrande, and James D. Jordan, 110 the entire basis of Vietnamese
society was not wiped away overnight by the revolution. In Vietnam many
aspects of the pre-revolutionary society already conformed to the socialist
structure, and thus remained in place after the revolution. The ground work for
the introduction of the Revolutionary Professional Soldier ethos was not only a
product of the communist revolution, but also of thousands of years of physical
and cultural domination and the notion of struggle, as described in Chapter III.
Unlike its socialist counterparts, the Vietnamese revolution was born of both
organic beliefs and modern socialist organizational structures.
In the beginning, however, the first groups to oppose French rule over
Vietnam were not doing so as a means of consciously reaffirming their traditional
Confucian ideology. Most were simply acting on behalf of a selfish concern over
losing their social status and economic power to foreigners. These first attempts
by the mandarin class to resist the French, however, failed because they lacked an
integrated ideological basis and the support of the peasants. However, with each
generation that passed, Vietnamese revolutionary movements became more
sophisticated and successful. At its earliest stage, resistance in Vietnam was
inspired by the antiforeignism and racial and cultural pride noted in Chapter III.
The racial and cultural xenophobia aspect of this strategy was reinforced in 1905
110|ames J. Jordan, "The Maoist vs. The Professional Vision of a People's Army,
in Military Power and Political Power" in China in the 1970's: Organization.
Leadership. Political Strategy , ed William W. Whitson, (New York: Irvington
Publishers, 1972)
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by the victory of fellow Asians, the Japanese, over the Russians in the Russo-
Japanese War. In order to overcome a lack of a uniting ideology, cultural pride
and antiforeignism served as a makeshift but useful framework for early
Vietnamese revolutionaries during the pre-World War I period. This approach
was further reinforced, but in a different way, by the influence of Sun Yat-Sen and
the Chinese revolution of 1911. Sun's combination of republicanism and
nationalism appealed to Vietnamese revolutionaries, because it excluded the
possibility of a rejuvenation of the imperial system and for the first time openly
questioned the ideological validity of Confucianism. Not surprisingly, Woodrow
Wilson also had an influence on the development of Vietnamese nationalism. His
ideas on the self-determination of peoples, however, lacked the organizational
and tactical implementation concepts found in Leninism. The experience of
World War I had exposed Vietnamese revolutionary leaders to democratic ideals
as well as communist ideology. Modern nationalism encompassing total reform
of society emerged as the most significant aspect of the revolutionary milieu
during the 20's and 30's.
The most important increment of the Vietnamese Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary movement that followed in the 1940's, was its integrating
"messianic" appeal. Ho's brand of Marxism-Leninism linked traditional
Vietnamese nationalism, defined as unconditional independence and
decolonization, with the concept of socioeconomic reform so badly desired by
the Vietnamese peasant class. Adding to its Vietnamese character was the fact
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that Leninist ideology included the notion of an educated elite, which resembled
the mandarinate system in Vietnam. These people, the mandarin's, had lead
earlier revolutions against both the Chinese and the French, and now saw
Leninism as an opportunity to again exert their influence by serving as the
architects or "Vanguard" of the latest revolution.
Unlike the model as revealed in Russia, China, and Israel, Ho's strategy
combined Western technique and anti-Western sentiment with socialist revolution.
The Viet Minh served as a middle ground for both traditional Vietnamese
nationalist, who wanted to drive all invaders into the sea, and the Sun Yat-Sen
type who wanted to reform Vietnamese society. The combination of Ho's
ideology and Giap's military skills offered not only an intellectual critique of
colonialism, but an organizational and tactical basis for anti-colonial military
operations.
This tactical flexibility aspect of Leninism, however, did prove to be a
critical factor in the eventual success of the Vietnamese revolution. Both Ho and
Giap noted that previous revolutions had failed due to an uncompromising
adherence to abstract principles. They determined to the path to victory lay in a
strategy that concentrated on operational realities instead of abstract principles.
Operational and ideological flexibility made possible the strategy of the united
front which, after many variations and shifts during the fused and symbiotic
phases, ultimately proved successful in 1975.
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However, unlike the other revolutions cited, Ho's theory involved a two
stage revolution in Vietnam. According to this concept, the socialist revolution
could only occur after a nationalist revolution had prepared the way by
overthrowing the colonial regime and establishing an indigenous "revolutionary"
government. Accordingly, the party followed a tactic of close collaboration with
both noncommunist and anti-French forces in the pre-revolution and Fused
periods (1940-1954). These non-Communist allies were then dealt with in the
Period of Civil-Military Evolution - Symbiotic phase.
During these periods, Ho proclaimed leadership of a united front in order to
gain control of the revolutionary movement and to increase its popular support.
Such fundamental socialist ideas as class warfare and social revolution were not
openly proclaimed as part of the Viet Minh's ideology of revolution at this time.
National independence was made the dominant issue until about 1950.
Viet Minh leaders of the revolution called on all classes of the Vietnamese
people to rally behind their leadership in the quest for independence and
liberation. Unlike the revolutions in Russia and China, the issue of national
independence took precedence over all political theories and plans for the post
revolutionary period. Ho, like the early Zionist leaders, recognized nationalism as
the lowest common denominator which could serve as an attractive ideology for
the largest number of people.
The Viet Minh for the first time began to exercise governmental control over
the political, economic, and security policies of the country during the Symbiotic
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period of civil-military relations (1955 - 1982). During this period, the primary
emphasis continued to focus on national unity with some radical social reforms
beginning to appear. 111 All social classes and ethnic groups were urged to
develop "the unity of the people" and to fall in behind the "revolutionary banner"
of the Viet Minh to resist the attempts by the US to overthrow the new socialist
revolutionary government. 112
The mystique of the Revolutionary Professional Soldier in Vietnam is closely
related to its ideology, which I have shown in the preceding chapters to have had
as its common denominator the general desire for national independence and
antiforeignism. The historic cultural and racial unity of the Vietnamese people
and the need for political unity in time of crisis were themes stressed by Viet
Minh organizers thorough out all three periods under review. 113 The
Revolutionary Professional Soldier mystique which came to prominence during
the Struggle for Liberation in Vietnam, drew its strength from the revolutionary
tradition of the country, the charismatic personality of Ho Chi Minh, and from
what ever confidence in the Viet Minh's ultimate victory may have been
engendered by its propaganda organizations or actual tactical successes.
111 Douglas Pike, War, Peace, and the Viet Cong . (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1969), pp. 23-25.
112Giap, pp. 40-14
113See Ho Chi Minh, On Revolution, pp. 143-145.
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When the Viet Minh appeared on the scene in the 1940's the habits and
attitudes necessary for successful insurgency and anti-government organizations
were already well-established in Vietnam. Anti-French revolts and plots had
occurred sporadically throughout the colonial period, and violent political intrigue
certainly predated the arrival of the French in IndoChina. The revolutionary ethos
found in the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people had been created long
before the appearance of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology. 114
The nature of the civil-miliary conflicts faced by the political and military
institutions in Vietnam are not unique. Many communist and developing nations
are today faced with the same types of problems discussed in this thesis. The
basic question of analysis revolves around the question of what type of military
does the state need to protect itself and what additional roles should the military
have in the economic developmental process? In the post Cold War era, the
threat to a states' survival can be both from foreign invasion and internal
economic collapse. Based on the growing integration of the military into the
economic arena, economic concerns are clearly being placed ahead of the
security concerns in modern Vietnam.
This unprecedented level of uncertainty has allowed the political leadership
of Vietnam to refocus the dual mission of the military to suit short term economic
goals. The leadership of the military, however, is very much aware of the long
114Giap, pp. 5-1 3.
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term threats posed by China and a resurgent Khmer Rouge in Cambodia to the
physical survival of the state.
It is the belief of this author that the ground work has been set for the final
evolutionary stage of civil-military relations in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
No longer are their actions of the party driven by a quest for a Utopian socialist
state. Today their focus is on developing a market based economy with in the
broadest interpretation of the socialist structure. This will in turn lead to an
expansion of the current democratization process and to a professionalization of
the military and its eventual disengagement from politics altogether. Only time
will tell if a lack of continued growth with in the Vietnamese economy or a
resurgence of military instability in the region will cause the party to reassert its
ideological controls over the military. If so, they would most likely accomplish
this through a combination of further integration of military elites into the party
senior leadership structure along with public appeals to the historical nationalistic
sentiment of the peoples armed forces.
In either case, as shown in this analysis, civil-military relations in Vietnam
are fluid and not static in nature. Both the party and the military understand the
necessity of adapting to the economic, political, and security landscape of the
state and the region. As the current economic reform program (Doi Moi) further
changes the economic structure of the state, so to will it cause changes in the
civil-military relationship. Despite the staunch socialist nature of the regime, I
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predict a continued movement by Vietnam toward not only economic, but social
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